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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CASE FOR
ADMINISTRATIVELY IMPOSED CIVIL
MONEY PENALTIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF POLICY OBJECTIVES
Legal sanctions have traditionally been created and enforced in
part because they are thought to channel human behavior in a desired direction. With the increase in governmental activity resulting
from the complexities of metropolitan life, a host of social welfare
regulations designed to insure minimal standards of health and
safety have been generated. Any efforts to protect and improve the
environment have been formulated by balancing economic and environmental priorities.' To date, most regulations have relied on
criminal sanctions and injunctions for enforcement.' Neither of
these sanctions has proven to be an effective deterrent to polluters
or an effective means of implementing environmental policy.'
1. The effect is that this country has been forced to balance economic and environmental considerations in order to determine how much environmental protection can be afforded
consistent with competing problems of inflation, unemployment, and energy production.
2. In the absence of total voluntary compliance, the effectiveness of any otherwise
enforceable law depends on the availability of adequate legal remedies to the enforcement
agency and its application of them. The purpose of remedial provisions in environmental
control is to deter future violation and thus to make future imposition of the remedy unnecessary. If remedial powers and procedures are broad, flexible, and speedy, and the penalties
are not trivial, the law can and will deter the prohibited behavior. A number of enforcement
devices are usually available to pollution control agencies: See, e.g., N.Y. ENvIR. CONSERV.
LAW § 19-0305(2)(1) (McKinney 1973) indicating that the Commissioner of Environmental
Conservation may "[dlo such other things as he may deem necessary, proper or desirable
"; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-14
in order that he may enforce codes, rules or regulations ....
(Supp. 1977), which empowers the State Department of Health to issue cease and desist
orders after investigating and discovering violations of environmental regulations; N.Y.
ENvIR. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2107 (McKinney 1973 Supp. 1976) which grants the power to issue
injunctions. Further, although no reported cases have come under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970) provides a fine from $500 to $2500, or imprisonment
of thirty days to one year, or both for dumping refuse of any kind into navigable waterways.
3. Since the use of injunctions and criminal sanctions have been costly and ineffective
as a means of encouraging environmental policy recommendations, it has been indicated that
more extensive use of civil penalties by federal agencies be employed to effectuate statutory
goals. State employment of civil money penalties is partially due to the federal decision to
use them in the field of environmental protection. For example, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975), requires a state
which desires to administer its own permit program pursuant to the Act to possess the
authority to abate pollution violations, including the authority to impose civil money penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975); see also 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(h) (1976).
The federal government has employed the use of civil money penalties in a number of
other areas of environmental control. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 309 (d), 311 (b)(6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319 (d), 1321 (b)(6) (Supp. V 1975);
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 14(a), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1)(a) (Supp. V
1975).
The use of civil money penalties has also begun to appear in a number of environmental
state statutes. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1042 (Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. ENVIR.
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In considering the usefulness of administratively imposed civil
money penalties4 as the primary means of encouraging compliance
with environmental objectives, this comment will demonstrate that
the civil money penalties are designed to reduce environmental pollution rather than to punish violators. 5 Further, it will be shown that
traditional sanctions, that is, the injunction, and the criminal imposition of money penalties are often slow and ineffective in encouraging environmental compliance. Finally, this comment will illustrate that the degree of environmental compliance will be influenced by the amount of the penalty imposed and the procedure used
to impose and collect them.
I.

TRADITIONAL SANCTIONS

Since good intentions alone will not be sufficient to preserve the
environment, and no major contribution to the solution is likely to
be found in voluntary measures on the part of public-spirited business concerns, it is necessary to examine the methods that have
been employed to implement and enforce policy objectives.'
The usual goal of environmental laws has been the reduction
of environmental pollution to an acceptable level and the maintenance of this level. While it is difficult to distinguish exactly what
factors' influence the implementation and enforcement of environmental policy, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has been an important stimulus to improved implementation
and more stringent enforcement. 8 To accomplish the goal of environ§§ 71-1707, -1725, -1929, -1941, -2103 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1976).
4. There are a number of civil remedies besides the money penalty. Examples are cease
and desist orders, injunctions, damages to injured parties, licensing on condition, revocation
of licenses, and publicity. For a more extensive review refer to McKay, Sanctions in Motion:
The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. Rxv. 441 (1964).
5. See Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 274 (1967), in which
the author discusses the effectiveness of legal sanctions.
6. Although this review of the traditional methods employed to implement environmental policy will discuss the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of each in theoretical terms, it
is important to note that practical problems, such as sufficient funds, manpower, etc., greatly
influence the efficacy of any technique. Moreover, in most situations, under present law, the
company that increases its expenses substantially to avoid polluting the environment will
generally find itself at a competitive disadvantage.
7. The usual factors influencing environmental policy are public opinion, legal requirements, the attitudes of the administration, Congress, and the Courts.
8. Prior to 1970, federal responsibility for environmental control was scattered among
a large number of agencies. For example, water pollution was the responsibility of the Department of Interior, while national air pollution was controlled by the Department of Health,
Education and Wvlfare. This fragmentation of agencies was changed by Reorg. Plan No. 3 of
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970); reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086
(1970).
The Ash Counsel, formed to consider how the agency was to be organized, concluded that
CONSERV. LAW
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mental protection, a certain level of air and water quality has often
been legislatively or administratively determined to be acceptable.,
Under traditional air and water programs, the polluters monitor
their own discharges and communicate the results to the proper
environmental enforcement agency, which periodically inspects the
polluter's plant to verify the reported rates. If the polluter is found
to have violated any condition of his industry's stipulated acceptable discharge, he may be enjoined from continuing such violations
0
or be subjected to various penalties.' Often traditional sanctions
applied in cases where there is damage to the environment appear
to be inappropriate and ineffective." In reviewing the methods that
have been employed to encourage compliance with environmental
policy, it will be illustrated that the injunction and the criminal
imposition of money penalties are more effective if used as additional leverage in particular cases, rather than as the primary sanction of a comprehensive environmental protection scheme.
A.

Injunctions

Although the injunction has served as an invaluable environmental tool because of its adaptability to diverse situations, its use
is limited because it is inapplicable to violations which have already
the basic structure of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should be along functional
lines such as enforcement, research, and standard setting. In 1974, the research budget of
EPA was cut, so it is now primarily a regulatory and enforcement agency.
The role of regulator and enforcer was also thrust upon EPA by deadlines of the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975), which required the agency
to take an extensive series of far-reaching and politically sensitive actions. These actions
included establishing regulations for specific industries and for the implementing of air and
water standards.
9. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 309-11, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319-1321 (Supp. V 1975); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
10. For a survey of state and municipal government enforcement techniques in the area,
see F. GRAD, G. RATHJENS & A. ROSENTHAL, ENFORCEMENT CONTROL: PRIORIIES, POLICIES, AND
THE LAW

117 (1971).

11. For example, as applied to the ordinary polluter, criminal fines prove to be too blunt
a weapon. In the majority of situations, faced with the first offender, juries are normally
unwilling to stigmatize the individuals responsible, preferring to acquit them or pass the
responsibility on to impersonal business entities. Further, when considering injunctions,
judges often grant continuances in an attempt to extort compliance and then settle for halfmeasures when faced with technical difficulties of full compliance. Conversely, criminal
procedures offer too many irrelevant protections for the uncooperative polluter, e.g., appeal,
granted of right to criminal defendants, often means either acquittal or the significant reducfor
tion of a fine. See generally Comment, Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials
Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALBANY L. REv. 61, 62-63 (1972); Schachter, Some Criteria
for Evaluating State and Local Air Pollution Control Laws, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Ray.
583, 633-34 (1973).
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occurred or are not expected to occur. 2 In employing the injunction,
which focuses on the prevention of future pollution, courts balance
the various equities in light of public policy considerations." 3 As a
practical matter, courts are more likely to enjoin a new abuse than
they are a continued defilement. 4 Since an injunction operates as a
deterrent only when it closes down a polluter's operation, courts are
reluctant to order a plant shutdown when the defendant can show
that the prospect of serious economic injury might be greater than
the environmental benefits to be realized." 5
Two recent decisions illustrate the court's reluctance to order
polluting plants to close down in the absence of some immediate
threat to human life. In United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 6 the
United States District Court of Minnesota found a serious health
threat, and ordered Reserve to immediately cease all discharges into
Lake Superior. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, considering a
motion to stay the district court's injunction, found little likelihood
that the taconite tailings discharged into the lake would produce an
eventual showing of a substantial health threat. Moreover, the court
of appeals reasoned that the industrial plant was central to the
economy of the entire region and that an immediate shutdown
would have a great economic impact on Reserve's three thousand
employees, their families, and the communities in which they lived.
Consequently, the stay was granted for the purpose of allowing
abatement to take place over a period of time according to a timetable. 7
12. See note 2 and accompanying text supra for a number of statutes which give the
courts the power to enjoin.
• 13. In determining whether the polluter should be forced
into immediate compliance
with environmental laws or be allowed to comply over an extended period of time, courts look
to whether the relief sought is against a long standing abuse such as the continued polluting
of a river or a projected new affront such as the destruction of a mountain.
14. In Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) a court order indefinitely continued
a
preliminary injunction barring the Secretary of Agriculture from selling timber in a relatively
untouched area.
15. See 33 U.S.C. § 1160(h) (1970), which encourages the enforcement of such judgments, as the public interest and equities of the case may require. See also Barry, Evolution
of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the
Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1106, 1120 (1970).
16. 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974) (injunction issued), aff'd with modifications, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (injunction modified to take place according to a timetable).
17. Implicit in the court's holding is a clear message, especially for counsel representing
the small or middle sized plant or facility which is not in compliance with a major environmental law. That is, if companies fail to effectively engage in voluntary compliance with
minimal business dislocation, then courts that recognize the remedial purposes of environmental laws are going to order compliance programs and dates which are often costly and
accelerated. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 417 F. Supp. 789, 790 (1976).
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In an earlier case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,"8 the New
York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the operation of a plant
which injured property of landowners through its emission of dirt,
smoke, and vibration. The court reasoned that the technology which
would permit operation without pollution had not yet been developed and that the defendant's investment in and contribution to the
economy of the community outweighed the injury complained of,
which was to property rather than to health. Instead, damages for
the permanent reduction in the value of the plaintiffs' property were
awarded. 19

In both cases, the important factors were the economic importance of the defendant's activity and the legislative nature of the
judicial action sought. Moreover, until recently there seemed to be
substantial likelihood that if the injunction was the principal tool
relied upon, polluters might find it economically advantageous to
20
keep polluting until all the channels of review had been exhausted.
While this all-or-nothing type of sanction may be appropriate in
cases of extremely hazardous violations, the effect of an injunction
as the principal enforcement tool, that is, forcing a polluter to close
down, is likely to cause more damage to the particular community
than it prevents.
Criminal Imposition of Money Penalties
Traditionally, criminal sanctions" have been employed to deter
anti-social behavior, including conduct detrimental to the environment. Despite the emphasis in anti-pollution legislation on criminal
sanctions, it has been argued that criminal prosecutions are seldom

B.

18. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). Boomer is an example of
a nuisance action in which the court refused to enjoin the cement plant because it felt the
important factors were the economic importance of the defendant's activity ind the legislative nature of the judicial action required.
19. It should be noted that while the defendants in both the Boomer and Reserve cases
were causing serious pollution problems, the respective appellate courts found an injunction
to be inappropriate since the economic importance of the defendant's activity in each instance was controlling. For a discussion of some of the present federal statutes that encourage
the denial of injunctions in the event of economic hardship see Barry supra note 15, at 1106,
1120; Gelpe & Tarlock, Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48
S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974).
20. Accelerated procedures have been established with respect to air pollution violations in the Clean Air Act, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-8 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857
c-8 (Supp. V 1975). What is necessary is similar speed-up procedures in connection with other
types of environmental violations.
21. For an illustration of a statute allowing the imposition of criminal sanctions for
continuous polluting of the environment see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111 § 142A (West 1971
Supp. 1977).
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used effectively in the enforcement of environmental laws and
objectives. 2 One of the problems with employing criminal sanctions
as the primary enforcement tool is that environmental discharges
are not a crime because they are considered morally wrong, but
merely because they have been declared unlawful. 3 Consequently,
the real deterrent effect of the criminal sanction, the stigma of
moral blame, is greatly reduced.
Further, the heaviest polluters are likely to be large business
concerns which cannot be imprisoned. Moreover, it is often impossible to prove personal culpability of individual officers. Since it is
difficult to determine the official responsible for the decision that
led to the violation, it is hard for the prosecution to establish criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. This being the case, a number
of recent environmental statutes have reduced the accountability
problem by simply making omission the basis of liability. 21 Although criminal money penalties can be imposed, unless they are
greater than the cost of compliance, they will have negligible deterrent effect. To date, the criminal fines that have been imposed have
been small and have been of little value. It should be noted that
for any monetary fines to be effective they must be more than the
cost of compliance.25
22. See generally Rosenthal, Federal Power to Protect the Environment: Available
Devices to Compel or Induce Desired Conduct, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 397, 414 (1972); Willick
& Windle, Rule Enforcement by the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District,
3
ECOLOGY L. Q. 507 (1973).
23. See Ball & Friedman, Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic
Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 216-17 (1965). In this article
it is
argued that since health and safety laws are considered to be malum prohibitum, the
deterrent value of the criminal sanction, the stigma of moral blame, is minimized. Cf. Gribetz
&
Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254,
1279
(1966). The authors point out that inadequate sentencing practices in housing cases arise
out
of the unwillingness of criminal courts to recognize housing violations as true "crimes,"
and
that the same odium does not attach to offenses mala prohibita as to those mala in se.
The
difficulty is not confined to prosecutions for housing violations but extends to virtually
all
municipal prosecutions' for health and safety offenses. There are grounds for apprehension
that the same attitudes may prevail in prosecutions for environmental offenses.
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54(q) (West 1975); 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
See also Kadish, Some Observationson the Use of CriminalSanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 436, 442 (1963). It should be pointed out that without
the usual requirements of criminal intent, and without any attachment of moral culpability
to the unlawful act, administrators and prosecutors are reluctant to invoke criminal
sanctions, jurors are reluctant to find guilt, and judges are reluctant to impose strong penalties.
Consequently, the real deterrent value of the criminal sanction, the stigma of moral blame,
is greatly reduced. See Grad, supra note 10, at 2-161.
25. See note 10 and accompanying text. It should be noted that there are a number
of
additional problems peculiar to corporate polluters. That is, increasingly corporations
are
agreeing to indemnify the officers and directors that might be fined if certain claims
are
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Further difficulties that arise in criminal prosecutions concern
the procedural drawbacks of the criminal justice system. For money
penalties to effectively encourage environmental objectives, the procedure for its imposition and collection must be immediate and not
amenable to deferment by the polluter, as is often the case when
injunctions and criminal sanctions are imposed. Consequently, for
money penalties to be an effective deterrent in 2environmental cases,
the procedural safeguards must be discarded.
As long as the context remains commercial, the damage of the
particular defendant not clearly discernible, and the violation not
negligible.2 1
intentional, the role of the criminal sanction will remain
However, the use of criminal sanctions are appropriate in cases of
intentional or reckless violations. In such a case some measure of
is involved and the sanction may act as an effecmoral culpability
2
1
tive deterrent.
C.

Civil Money Penalties

A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that is imposed in a civil
29
proceeding for a violation of the law. While civil money penalties
may be considered a sanction since they are imposed to eliminate
violations, their primary objective is not to punish violators or collect revenue. 0 The purpose of these penalties is to deter future violabrought against them. Further, stockholders may be able to assert a derivative action against
officers or directors whose illegal conduct caused the corporation to be fined. See Dyksta,
Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 74 (1964). It is interesting to note that some
major underwriters insuring officers and directors against stockholder suits have excluded
from coverage actions based on air and water pollution. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1971, at 1, col.
3 (city ed.).
26. Procedural safeguards appear inappropriate in environmental money penalty cases,
since they do nothing to enhance the implementation of environmental policy objectives. For
further discussion concerning why criminal prosecutions have been ineffective in enforcing
environmental protection laws see Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 414-15.
27. See Comment, Increasing Community Control Over CorporateCrime-A Problem
in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YAL L. J. 280, 282-87 (1961), in which it is argued that the
in
criminal fine as presently administered is but a "reasonable license fee" for engaging
conduct.
prohibited
It should be pointed out that as long as the violation is not reckless, wanton, or intentional, and the context remains commercial, the situation may begin to resemble the enforceprivate
ment of antitrust laws. That is, the role of the criminal sanction is negligible, while the
State
treble damage action would be more significant. See Flynn, Criminal Sanctions under
(1967).
1304-05
1301,
REv.
L.
and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 TEXAS
28. An example of such a provision is N.Y. ENviR. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1933 (McKinney
1973 Supp. 1976).
29. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
30. In pollution control regulation, the philosophy that the sole purpose of the fine is
and
to eliminate violations is embodied in provisions authorizing the agency to compromise
STAT. ANN. § 26:2CN.J.
e.g.,
See,
penalty.
the
of
rebate
a
including
often
penalty,
a
settle
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tions, compensate for environmental damage, and aid in the internalization of pollution costs.
For civil penalties to be effective as a deterrent, two basic conditions must be met: (1) the amount of the penalties should be
meaningful, and (2) the procedures preceding the imposition of the
penalties should be swift yet not abuse the violators' procedural
rights. In determining the effectiveness of civil money penalties, it
is important to keep in mind that it is appropriate in a wide variety
of situations whereas injunctions and criminal sanctions can be
employed only in a limited number of situations. 3'
Except in the case of intentional or reckless violations, civil
money penalties have a number of distinct advantages over criminal
sanctions in that they effect deterrence by the use of economic disincentives rather than by fixation of moral blame. This avoids the
problems inherent in the criminal sanction and prevents harmful
acts which are considered morally culpable. Further, while criminal
procedures offer a number of irrelevant protections for a polluter, 32
by employing civil money penalties as the primary enforcement tool
the apparatus of apprehending and punishing violators swiftly and
accurately would more effectively deter violations. 31
As penalties are set to achieve an optimum level of environmental quality, traditional criminal techniques fail to take into account
that it is the cumulative effect of numerous morally blameless violations that bring about pollution. Further, while moral blameworthiness is an essential element of traditional criminality, society does
not dictate the same moral necessity to apprehend polluters as to
apprehend thieves. Rather, environmental objectives are to stop
enough polluters so as to reduce overall pollution to a tolerable
3
level.
19 (Supp. 1977). For an interesting discussion of penalties see Schwartz & Orleans, supra note
5, at 277.
31. Where it would not be in the public interest to enjoin an entire operation which is
important to a local economy, the civil money penalty seems more appropriate since it can
be imposed swiftly without hindering the community. For a discussion of situations where
the enforcement authority has only the choice of no remedy or a drastically harsh one, see
Goldschmid, Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, Recommendation 72-6, 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES:

JuLy 1, 1970-DEc. 31, 1972.
32. For a discussion of the procedural provisions involved in environmental control see
Kovel, A Casefor Civil Penalties:Air Pollution Control,46 J. URB.L. 153, 155-58 (1969); note
20 supra and articles cited therein.
33. That is, civil money penalties effect deterrence by the use of economic disincentives
rather than fixation of moral blame. Moreover, it avoids subjecting the offender to the stigma
of a lifetime criminal record for conduct he may not have known was wrongful. See Gribetz
& Grad, supra note 24, at 1285.
34. In criminal proceedings it is the stigma of moral blameworthiness that is meant to
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Since there is no stigma attached to environmental violations,
the only advantage in proceeding criminally seems to be the ultimate power to punish severely, such as by imprisonment. Although
many commentators argue it is socially regrettable that the moral
sense of community is not sufficiently developed to consider pollution morally wrong, until it is, there is little sense in unnecessarily
handicapping regulatory efforts. 5 Moreover, it is unfair to expect a
moral sense of guilt to develop around each of the thousands of
existing regulatory offenses. Further, in matters such as environmental control there is nothing in the offense that might give rea36
sonable notice to an offender as to the law's requirement. A shift
to a civil money penalty as a primary tool to encourage environmental protection would not help people learn all the laws and the
technical standards, but it would serve to show that they are not
morally to blame for their ignorance.
In view of the growing federal and state acceptance of civil
money penalties, 37 it may be beneficial to increase their use toward
the ultimate objective-voluntary compliance. Moreover, the inappropriateness of the criminal law in environmental violations has
served to increase resentment at its intrusion where it has demonstrated incompetence in effectively apprehending and punishing
violators. Because of this misapplication of the criminal law, the
apparatus of apprehension, proof, and appeal is complicated and
pointless.
II.

DETERMINATION OF AN EFFECTIVE MONEY PENALTY

As seen in the preceding sections, the purpose of imposing penalties for environmental violations is to deter violations and make
the imposition of the penalty unnecessary. To assure that the efficiency of civil money penalties is realized, the method by which
shame the offender and to deter others. It has been argued that people resent the state's
attempt to impose a stigma for environmental pollution, when their sense of morality tells
them none belongs. Consequently, juries in environmental litigation react against the state's
attempt and do not blame the defendant, and treat him leniently. See Hart, Aims of the
CriminalLaw, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 418 n. 42 (1958).
35. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 23, at 200, in which the authors point out that
traditional crimes may be "wrong" because we are accustomed to calling them crimes, and
presumably if we keep pretending that pollution is immoral, eventually people will be thereby
educated to consider it immoral. Meanwhile, however, it seems that the educational function
of the criminal law will be severely disserved when social welfare laws are ineffective and
largely discarded.
36. See Hart, supra note 36, at 420.
37. See City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146
(1974).
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fines are assessed is an important consideration. That is, in establishing effective penalty provisions and guidelines, the amount and
procedure by which penalties are to be imposed must be selected
with great care. One such guideline is the minimum fine. The minimum fine is at least as important as the maximum fine in determining whether the amount of the fine is meaningful. The reason for
this lies in the fact that the minimum fine is generally imposed
more frequently than any other fine. Further, it has been argued
that the minimum amount cannot be trivial, and the maximum
must be sufficiently substantial to have a significant effect on most
businesses. For large companies, the only fine that will have a significant effect is probably the one that exceeds the cost of compliance.3
In cases of repetitive environmental violations, the cumulative
effect is what is harmful rather than an isolated act. Consequently,
it has been argued, that a per diem fine would be more effective
than a fine assessed for each individual violation. The advantage of
per diem fines appears to lie in the fact that continuing violators
incur severe penalties through accumulation even though basic per
diem penalties are not unreasonable. 3
In computing penalties to be assessed, it is also important to
determine the damage to the environment caused by the violation.
The importance of being able to determine the amount of damage
to the environment is apparent when the costs of the damage are
shifted to the polluter rather than to society which incurs the economic loss. The predominant function of penalties in this type of
situation is not deterrence, but rather compensation for the harm
to society.40
38. In this instance the fine against the large company might appear outrageously
excessive if applied to smaller companies. In determining an appropriate fine it is important
to keep in mind that if it is too excessive, the company might pay the fine but attempt to
lobby and change the law. At this point other sanctions must be accessible to gain compliance. Such measures include publicizing the violation and also the possibility of criminal
sanctions. Generally a relatively unblemished community or national image is a highly valuable intangible asset. Further, it is interesting to point out that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act provides a $10,000 civil money penalty for the person in charge of a facility or
vessel making an illegal discharge of oil into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.
39. In cases of continuing discharges, the critical provision necessary to insure real
deterrence is that the penalty exceed the cost of abatement. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(h)(2)
(1976), which provides in part that civil penalties imposed for water and air pollution violations should "represent an actual and substantial economic deterrent to the actions for which
they are assessed or levied."
40. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAnTY CODE § 39262 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
403.121 (West 1973). Statutes such as these often provide for penalties in addition to liability
for environmental damage, such as clean up costs:
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In assessing penalties with the intent to achieve compliance, it
appears to be good policy to set a penalty that the polluter can
afford. Further, it has been argued that expenditures made by the
polluter in compliance efforts should be considered in mitigating the
penalties.' Since such efforts are evidence of the polluter's attempts
to internalize the costs, some states provide for remission of all or
part of the penalty if the violation is immediately corrected. This
appears to be good policy since it encourages compliance after penalties are collected, and serves to emphasize that the purpose of civil
money
42 penalties is to deter violations rather than to punish violators.
Some environmental statutes possess the drawback that penalties cannot be assessed for violations which occur prior to the issuance of a cease and desist order." In such cases a significant factor
becomes whether penalty fines commence on the first day of the
violation or from the date on which the violation was to have been
eliminated in accordance with a cease and desist order. Cease and
desist orders generally give the violator ample time in which to
correct the violation, and therefore the amount of fines may be
significantly less if they run from the date the violation was to have
been eliminated. Thus, statutes that require a cease and desist order
for assessment of a penalty will have negligible effect as a deterrent
compared to one commencing on the day that the polluter first
receives notice of the violation." Rather than allowing a violator to
escape responsibility until he receives notice of his violations from
the government, cease and desist orders should function so as to
impose liability from the day the violation began. 5
1Il.

TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL MONEY

PENALTIES

The flexibility and effectiveness of civil money penalties are
greatly affected by the procedure used in assessing and collecting
the penalties. The growth and visibility of environmental litigation
has prompted serious debate as to how the judiciary should handle
41. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvII. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1941(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1977).
43. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2103(1) (McKinney 1973 Supp. 1976).
44. It should be pointed out the loss of deterrence may be mitigated by provisions which
allow the agency to issue the cease and desist order at the time of the original notice of the
violation. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1977).
45. For an interesting approach to the problem see 1973 Conn. Pub. Acts, 73-665, § 2(2)
which provides an initial maximum penalty of $25,000 plus $1,000 for each day of violation
after the final order, which may be entered twenty five days later.
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such matters. Two basic procedures are most often utilized in assessing and collecting penalties for environmental violations. They
are the judicial imposition and the administrative imposition of
civil money penalties.
A number of state statutes provide a very inflexible procedure
for the judicial imposition of civil money penalties for environmental violations." The state environmental enforcement agency makes
an assessment of the polluter's liability caused by his violations and
then brings a civil action in court, seeking an imposition of whatever
penalties are provided by the state statute. 7 Here the court has
complete discretion to impose or not to impose any penalties; as well
as complete discretion concerning the amount of such penalty. In
this type of process the polluter is entitled to a de novo trial on both
the merits and the amount of the penalty assessed.48
A more flexible procedure involves the administrative imposition of civil money penalties.49 In this case the state environmental
agency, in an administrative hearing, would determine the polluter's liability and the amount of the penalty to be assessed. The
polluter would then be entitled to judicial review, which would be
limited to a determination of whether the amount of the penalty was
supported by substantial evidence. 0 If the polluter did not seek
review or pay the determined penalty, the environmental agency
could enforce the penalty as if it were a court judgment,5' or institute a streamlined collection proceeding in the courts. It should be
noted that in this collection proceeding the polluter is not able to
raise issues as to his liability or as to the reasonableness of the
52
penalty.
A variation of the administratively imposed procedure is employed in Ohio, 3 as well as in other states.54 It is similar to the above
procedure in that the state environmental agency determines both
the polluter's liability and the amount of the penalty to be assessed.
However, in some states, if the polluter does not voluntarily make
the payment, a suit must be instituted to compel payment. At this
46. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13385-86 (West Supp. 1974), MINN. STAT. ANN. §
115.071, subd. 3 (West 1977).
47. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.253 (Vernon 1972).
48. See Goldschmid supra note 31, at 907.
49. See, e.g., 1973 Conn. Pub. Acts, 73-665, § 2(2); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAw §§ 711707, -1729, -1941 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1976).
50. See, e.g., 1973 Conn. Pub. Acts, 73-665, § (4).
51. Id. See also, PA. STAT. ANN. v. 35, § 691.605 (Purdon 1977).
52. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvIR. CONSERV. LAw §§ 71-1707, -1941 (McKinney 1973 & Supp.
1976).
53. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.30 (Page 1971).
54. See, e.g., COLO. RED. STAT. § 25-8-608 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1033,
1042 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
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time the polluter is entitled to limited judicial review of the agency's
action. 5 The difference between the administrative procedures and
the judicial procedures for the imposition of civil money penalties,
lies in the fact that under the administrative procedure the polluter
is entitled only to a limited form of judicial review.
In considering the feasibility of administratively imposed civil
money penalties for all environmental violations, it should be
pointed out that the only advantage of the judicially imposed procedure is that enforcement institutions are more familiar with it. However, while judicially imposed civil money penalties avoid legal
questions that arise when an administrative agency performs tasks
of a judicial nature, the system lacks much of the flexibility that
makes civil money penalties so desirable.5 6 In order for civil money
penalties to be effective in encouraging environmental protection,
cases must be resolved quickly, efficiently, and at relatively low
cost. While this is possible if done administratively, penalties which
are judicially imposed are much slower and much more costly due
to court procedures. 57 It has also been argued that the courts are
already overcrowded and that two factors would increase the strain
on the system. First, environmental litigation is complex and often
lengthy. Second, the number of cases added to the docket would be
large, in that the imposition of the civil money penalty would need
to be assessed by the court.5 8 Since the courts are already overburdened and the costs of environmental litigation usually exceed the
amount of the penalty assessed, the state environmental agencies
often accept meager settlements, believing they have no choice.
Consequently, the judicial imposition procedure favors large corporations which can more easily afford to contest the environmental
agency's action, knowing that if settlement is not reached, the
agency may not be able or willing to go to court.59
Under the administrative imposition of civil money penalties,
55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2C-19, 23:5-28 (Supp. 1977). This provides a procedure
for a court-imposed penalty for environmental violations. Here the polluter is offered a summary court proceeding without the right to a jury trial.
56. Agency proceedings can be more flexible and expert depending upon enabling legislation. The agency will generally have an easier time obtaining evidence, through less stringent constitutional provisions of admissibility and also through reporting requirements. Although hearings would be subject to the due process requirements and administrative acts,
enforcement officers would be better off because the procedure would be more likely to reach
the real issues. See McKay, supra note 4, at 454-55 and cases cited therein.
57. See Schachter, supra note 11, at 630.
58. For an extensive evaluation of how the system of court-imposed penalties has functioned on the federal level see Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 919-27.
59. See Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 921-23.
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low settlements will be avoided by eliminating the pressures created
by the unavailability of overburdened courts and the expense of
using them in such complex litigation10 Moreover, there will be no
opportunity for wealthy violators to avoid settlement as is the case
when civil money penalties are imposed by way of the courts."
A further drawback in the system of judicially imposed penalties is that a danger exists that environmental violations and enforcement of civil money penalties will be inadequately treated by
piecemeal methods of litigation. That is, courtroom battles appear
to slow down effective environmental policymaking. Moreover, litigation often fails to provide sufficient opportunities for expert analysis and broad perspective that environmental policymaking requires.2 More effective enforcement may be provided by state environmental agencies, which are able to specialize in a particular field
and are often better suited to administer the penalties in a consistent fashion pursuant to specific policy objectives.13
A number of the problems that arise when civil money penalties
are imposed in a judicial proceeding can be avoided by statutes
which allow the state environmental agency to recover, through the
penalty action, reasonable costs and expenses in detecting, controlling, and abating violations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this "new era" 4 of environmental and economic regulation,
there is a need for an approach which genuinely facilitates substantive review of environmental discharges. Judge Bazelon 65 expressed
the fear that in many areas of rulemaking, such as, environmental
60. See Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 928. He argues that the availability of fair and
realistic settlements is crucial to an effective environmental enforcement policy, because a
civil money penalty will not reduce environmental violations where the amount assessed is
far below the polluter's cost of compliance.
61. See Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 929.
62. It should be indicated that similar arguments have been made in other highly
complex areas of law.
63. See Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 924. Here he points out that as a practical
matter, fair and impartial treatment may be more easily obtained under an administrative
proceeding in which a civil money penalty is imposed. He notes that where a de novo trial is
available in court, an agency may tend to forego usual procedural protections and put less
emphasis on acting fairly and reasonably. He points out that, paradoxically, where an illtreated or innocent defendant who cannot afford to fight the agency action in court, or will
not because the proposed penalty is less than the cost of litigation, a settlement is likely. Such
a defendant will therefore forfeit the right to even limited judicial review.
64. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
65. See International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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law, the exercise of substantive review dangerously taxes the courts'
competence, converting them into superagencies charged with second guessing the technological and scientific judgments of rulemakers.
Since legislators are still searching for an effective enforcement
tool to aid in the implementation of environmental policy, civil
money penalties that are imposed by the state environmental
agency appear to be flexible and ideally suited to environmental
offenses. Moreover, the civil money penalty appears to be especially
effective in encouraging compliance when the damage is measured
by the profit reaped from the undesirable conduct." Further, the
civil money penalty operates on the premise that where the penalty
is greater than the polluter's cost of abatement, the polluter will
choose to comply with the law and abate his pollution rather than
pay the penalty. Thus, the civil money penalty is designed to reduce
environmental pollution, and partially internalize the costs of pollution, rather than impose the entire burden of these costs on society
as a whole.
In order to assure its effectiveness, the civil money penalty
should be administered to achieve maximum flexibility while providing the ipolluter with fair and reasonable treatment. The degree
of flexibility will be greatly affected by the procedure used in imposition and collection. That is, the state environmental agency
should determine the extent of the polluter's violation and the
amount of the penalty. Under this administrative approach, a penalty could be assessed soon after the violation occurred, rather than
after following the slow and inflexible procedure of judicial imposition.
In short, incentives are needed which are designed to obtain
compliance in broader terms than the traditional negative sanction
of criminally imposed fines and jail sentences. 7 Thus, legislation
approving administratively imposed civil money penalties by a
state environmental agency should be enacted in an attempt to
effectively deter excessive pollution in instances where the industry
is not acting willfully and the industry cannot for policy reasons be
enjoined from operating.
Richard S. Wayne
66.

See, e.g., FLA.

67.

See

STAT. ANN.

MODEL PENAL CODE
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